Regarding your question if there is a mitzvah nowadays to live in Eretz Yisroel, as the Ramban says, or if there is no mitzvah nowadays, as Rabbeinu Chaim says, quoted in Tosafos on Kesubos 110b: Most poskim hold it is a mitzvah. But it is obvious that this is not an obligatory mitzvah in our time, for if so, it would result in a prohibition to live in Chutz Laaretz because doing so would be violating a positive commandment, like wearing a four-cornered garment without tzitzis, which is forbidden because it transgresses the positive commandment of tzitzis. But we only find a prohibition regarding one who lives in Eretz Yisroel, who is forbidden to leave with the intention of dwelling permanently in Chutz Laaretz – see Rambam Hilchos Melachim 5:9. And this prohibition is certainly not a negative commandment. Had it applied to the Jews of Chutz Laaretz, the Rambam would have written, ‘It is forbidden to live in Chutz Laaretz unless there is a strong famine in Eretz Yisroel.’ So we see that it is a Rabbinic prohibition, only for those who dwell in Eretz Yisroel. But as far as the Biblical positive commandment, it is not obligatory, only that if one lives there he fulfills the mitzvah. And in my Chiddushim I have written at great length about the words of Rabbeinu Chaim in Tosafos in Kesubos. Now, since it is not an obligatory mitzvah, you must definitely take into consideration the concern of Rabbeinu Chaim in Tosafos as to whether you will be able to keep the special mitzvos of Eretz Yisroel.” (Igros Moshe, Even Hoezer 1:102)
Here Rav Moshe states that even the Ramban does not obligate a Jew to make Aliyah in our time. Rather, he says that one who lives in Eretz Yisrael is fulfilling a mitzvah. How did the mitzvah become a mitzvah kiyumis, a mitzvah that is not obligatory, if during the times of the Temple it was an obligatory mitzvah? It must be that this change is due to the Three Oaths: It is impossible to say that every Jew has an obligation to make Aliyah because if so, the entire Jewish people would go and they would transgress the oaths.
And those who travel to Eretz Yisrael, although we are unfortunately not yet redeemed, should not tear their garments when seeing the city of Jerusalem, because through Hashem Yisborach’s kindness it is beautifully built up and it is at least not in the possession of non-Jews. One must say the prayer only when one sees the place of where the Temple stood, even if one sees it from afar, and all the more so when he comes to the Kosel. And when one sees the cities of Yehuda, which are today in the hands of the non-Jews, and similarly if there is a part of Jerusalem that is in the hands of the non-Jews, even if it is built beautifully, one must tear one’s garments. (Igros Moshe Orach Chaim 4:70 paragraph 11)
Some Zionists have argued that we see here that Rav Moshe was happy about the State of Israel and its governance over Jerusalem. However, if we look carefully in Orach Chaim 561 in the Beis Yosef and the Bach, we will see that there is a difference between them. The Beis Yosef writes that if non-Jews live in a place, even if it is built up, one who sees it must tear his garments. This implies that it depends on who is living there and not on who is in power.
However, the Bach proves from verses in Tanach that it depends on who is in power, because we find (Yirmiyahu 41:5) that the men tore their garments after seeing cities that were still inhabited by Jews because now they were under the power of the king of Babylonia. And the Mishnah Berurah (561:2) rules in accordance with the Bach:
One who sees the cities of Yehuda in their destruction says: “Your holy cities have become a desert,” and he tears his garments. – This means in their destroyed state, even if Jews live there, since the Arabs rule over them it is called “in their destroyed state.”
Reb Moshe, on the other hand, seems to have followed the opinion of the Beis Yosef because he writes that if there is a part of Jerusalem that is in the hands of the nations, one must tear one’s garments. Now, he wrote this in 1979 when the entire Jerusalem was under Israeli sovereignty. So what did he mean that part of Jerusalem might be in the possession of the nations? It must be that he meant that if there is a part of Jerusalem where non-Jews live, for example the Muslim quarter or the Christian quarter, one must tear one’s garments. So we see that Reb Moshe held that it depends on who lives there, not who has the power. If so, when he writes earlier that Jerusalem is at least not under in the possession of non-Jews, he means that the Jewish quarter has Jews living in it and that’s a good thing. But he never said that the sovereignty of the Zionists is a good thing.
In Orach Chaim 4:75, Reb Moshe permits women to carry weapons in Gush Etzion. In Yoreh De’ah 4:33, he replies to two Yeshiva students in Eretz Yisroel who asked whether they should learn Torah or join the army.
Although the idea of a defense force is important, the idea of learning Torah, for those who learn it, is even greater than defending the country, as it is stated explicitly in the first chapter of Bava Basra, 8a, “All must contribute to putting up doors in the walls of the city, even the orphans, but not the Torah scholars because they do not need protection.”
Does this prove that Reb Moshe held that the state is allowed to exist with its army? The answer is that this does not prove that he approved of the state, only that he held that given the current situation where there is a state, protecting the lives of its citizens is an important thing.
In the Sefer Mesores Moshe, volume one, page 591, we read:
Reb Moshe read in the newspaper about a group of extremists who wrote, as they often do, that Chabad were heretics because they did not care about the three oaths, not to go up as a wall, etc. And Reb Moshe said, “This is shocking – how can people use the word Apikoros so easily? If someone keeps the mitzvos and has the beliefs that are essential to being a Jew, how could we call him an Apikoros because of such a thing? And in general, how can we make such a big deal out of something that’s mentioned only in the Gemara, but not in the Shulchan Aruch? And even most of the Rishonim don’t mention it. We see from this that it is not one of the fundamentals of Judaism. And in general, it’s something that can be explained as one wishes. How can we make someone an Apikoros because of this? And even regarding the Mizrachi, whom some call Apikorsim, one cannot say this, because they do not transgress the fundamentals of Judaism, and it’s forbidden to use these names so lightly.”
In Mesores Moshe, volume three, page 366, Reb Moshe was asked about the three oaths:
Reb Moshe smiled and said, “First of all, it is difficult to know how to rule on a thing that is not mentioned in any place as halacha, only in the Gemara. And the idea that the oaths are interdependent is a good logical argument, because we find this in the Midrash at the end of Parshas Vayeitzei, brought in Tosafos Bava Kamma 38b, that Dovid said to the Moabites that it was permitted to transgress the prohibition of fighting against Moab because the Moabites had already started the fight by hiring Bilaam. So we can learn from this wherever there are two oaths, it is considered that one is conditional upon the other. And besides, I don’t know when we transgressed this oath.
His criticism is about certain unnamed individuals from an extremist sect who called people Apikorsim just because they permitted the state of Israel. To this, Reb Moshe gives two responses. 1) Even if it were clear from the Gemara that transgressing the oaths is kefirah (heresy), one would not be allowed to call someone an Apikoros because of this, because it’s not brought in the Poskim. 2) The passage in the Gemara about the oaths can be explained as one wishes. It can be understood as a subject of apikorsus or just a plain prohibition. And not only that, although it would be wrong to conclude from the Gemara that the state of Israel is permitted, since it’s possible to explain it that way if someone has the desire to do so, such a person cannot be called a meizid, a deliberate sinner or deliberate non-believer.
Not only Reb Moshe said this, but the Satmar Rebbe said it too. Even though he held strongly that violating the oaths is a matter of kefirah (heresy), it is obvious that he would not have called people who don’t agree to his opinion kofrim, heretics. For example, it would not be forbidden to drink wine that they touched or eat from animals that they slaughtered, or to count them for a minyan. Because although the subject is a question of emunah and kefirah, someone who does not understand the kefirah in it is like anyone who thinks that a certain matter is not written in the Torah and therefore denies it. Such a person is not an apikoros.
The reason for this is explained in Vayoel Moshe Siman 42, where the Satmar Rebbe quotes the Chasam Sofer Yoreh Deah 356, who writes:
However, it is impossible for me to believe that our geulah should be one of the principles of emunah and that if this were to fall, the entire wall of Judaism would fall. If, G-d forbid, our sins led to Hashem punishing us forever with exile, as Rabbi Akiva holds regarding the Ten Tribes that they will never come back, would that then be a reason to permit us to throw off the yoke of Hashem or to change even one stroke of the pen from the words of the Sages? Heaven forbid. We do not serve Hashem in order to eat the fruits of the land and sate ourselves with its goodness, but rather we wish to do Hashem’s will for its own sake. Come what may, we will remain the servants of Hashem; let Him do with us whatever He wishes. This is not a foundational principle to build upon. But since the fundamental of emunah is to believe in the Torah and Nevi’im, and there in the Torah and Nevi’im it is written that we will have a final redemption, in Parshas Nitzavim and Parshas Haazinu as the Ramban there says, and more about it is written in the Nevi’im, therefore someone who denies the redemption is a denier of the belief in the Torah and the Nevi’im.
The Satmar Rebbe uses this as a basis to argue that other things that are written in the Torah regarding the geulah, for example the fact that the Jewish people will repent before the geulah, we have to believe because they are included in the principle of believing in the Torah. But at the same time, this means that anyone who does not know that this is written in the Torah, or mistakenly believes that the Torah means something else, is not called a heretic. This would not apply to other principles of emunah where it could indeed be said if the foundation falls, the entire wall falls, as the Chasam Sofer puts it, for example, belief in the existence of the Creator and the giving of the Torah. In those cases, even one who disbelieves because of lack of knowledge is a heretic.
The quote attributed to Reb Moshe that the oaths are not mentioned in any place as halacha seems to be an exaggeration or mistake on the part of the author of that sefer (Rabbi Mordechai Tendler), because in the first section quoted above, he himself quotes Reb Moshe as saying only that most (not all) of the Rishonim do not mention it.
And regarding what he says that the interdependence of the oaths is a good logical argument, similar to Dovid HaMelech and the Moabites, it is indeed a good logical argument regarding the oath not to rebel against the nations, which is an oath between the Jewish people and the nations, but not as far as the oath against going up as a wall, which has no connection with the nations. We can assume that that was what Reb Moshe meant.
As far as Reb Moshe’s statement that he does not know when we transgressed these oaths, he probably meant that it is a machlokes whether the oath forbids only conquest or even mass immigration, and what number of immigrants is considered enough to violate this prohibition. It’s too bad that Reb Moshe did not explain these possibilities so that future generations could learn from him.
I Will Await Him 
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